Introduction The Theaetetus, which probably dates from about BC, is arguably Plato's greatest work on epistemology. Arguably, it is his greatest work on anything.
His two respondents are Theaetetus, a brilliant young mathematician, and Theaetetus' tutor Theodorus, who is rather less young and rather less brilliant.
Also like other Platonic dialogues, the main discussion of the Theaetetus is set within a framing conversation ac between Eucleides and Terpsion cp. This frame may be meant as a dedication of the work to the memory of the man Theaetetus.
Sedley 6—8 has argued that it is meant to set some distance between Plato's authorial voice and the various other voices including Socrates' that are heard in the dialogue. Alternatively, or also, it may be intended, like Symposium —3, to prompt questions about the reliability of knowledge based on testimony.
The Theaetetus reviews three definitions of knowledge in turn; plus, in a preliminary discussion, one would-be definition which, it is said, does not really count.
Each of these proposals is rejected, and no alternative is explicitly offered.
Thus we complete the dialogue without discovering what knowledge is. We discover only three things that knowledge is not Theaetetus c; cp. This matters, given the place that the Theaetetus is normally assigned in the chronology of Plato's writings.
If so, and if we take as seriously as Plato seems to the important criticisms of the theory of Forms that are made in the Parmenides, then the significance of the Theaetetus's return to the aporetic method looks obvious.
Apparently Plato has abandoned the certainties of his middle-period works, such as the theory of Forms, and returned to the almost-sceptical manner of the early dialogues.
In the Theaetetus, the Forms that so dominated the Republic's discussions of epistemology are hardly mentioned at all. A good understanding of the dialogue must make sense of this fact. Summary of the Dialogue At the gates of the city of Megara in BC, Eucleides and Terpsion hear a slave read out Eucleides' memoir of a philosophical discussion that took place in BC, shortly before Socrates' trial and execution ac.
In this, the young Theaetetus is introduced to Socrates by his mathematics tutor, Theodorus. Socrates questions Theaetetus about the nature of expertise, and this leads him to pose the key question of the dialogue: Theaetetus' first response D0 is to give examples of knowledge such as geometry, astronomy, harmony, arithmetic a-c.
Socrates objects that, for any x, examples of x are neither necessary nor sufficient for a definition of x de.
Theaetetus admits this, and contrasts the ease with which he and his classmates define mathematical terms with his inability to define of knowledge ce.
Theaetetus, he suggests, is in discomfort because he is in intellectual labour ed. Socrates does not respond to this directly. Instead he claims that D1 entails two other theories Protagoras' and Heracleitus'which he expounds ee and then criticises ec.
Socrates eventually presents no fewer than eleven arguments, not all of which seem seriously intended, against the Protagorean and Heracleitean views. If any of these arguments hit its target, then by modus tollens D1 is also false.
A more direct argument against D1 is eventually given at —7. In b4—8, Theaetetus proposes a second definition of knowledge: There follows a five-phase discussion which attempts to come up with an account of false belief. All five of these attempts fail, and that appears to be the end of the topic of false belief.
Finally, at dc, Socrates returns to D2 itself. He dismisses D2 just by arguing that accidental true beliefs cannot be called knowledge, giving Athenian jurymen as an example of accidental true belief. Theaetetus tries a third time.
The ensuing discussion attempts to spell out what it might be like for D3 to be true, then makes three attempts to spell out what a logos is. In dd, the famous passage known as The Dream of Socrates, a two-part ontology of elements and complexes is proposed.
Parallel to this ontology runs a theory of explanation that claims that to explain, to offer a logos, is to analyse complexes into their elements, i. Crucially, the Dream Theory says that knowledge of O is true belief about O plus an account of O's composition.attention to clarify the notions we intuitively envolve into a definition of knowledge, e.g.
Russell's theory of knwoledge as it can be seen in The Problems of Philosophy. I maked room for the theme and also for Plato's approach, I want to enter a bit in his deffinition.
For thousands of years, many philosophers have attempted to understand what propositional knowledge is and what defines it. A popular and widely accepted solution is ‘The Tripartite Theory’, which says that propositional knowledge is defined as ‘Justified True Belief’, first credited to the philosopher Plato.
theory about quantum physics designed to distinguish the difference between a true belief and knowledge Schrodinger's Cat (the theory itself) A cat is in a steel chamber with a 50/50 chance of having hydrocyanic acid poured on it and being killed.
philosophers use the tripartite theory of knowledge, which analyses knowledge as justified true belief, as a working model.
|The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)||Order Assignment This order has already been completed on Studybay On Studybay you can order your academic assignment from one of our professional writers.|
|According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:|
|Knowledge as Justified True Belief||
it is propositional knowledge that is in view in most epistemology. The second condition for knowledge, according to the tripartite theory, is truth. If one knows a. Learn term:knowledge = justified true belief with free interactive flashcards.
Choose from different sets of term:knowledge = justified true belief flashcards on Quizlet. Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S • the conditions are not individually necessary • the conditio it strengthens the justification condition by stating it cant.